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NOTES
COPYRIGHTABILITY OF SOFTWARE:
PIRACY ON THE WATERS OF
PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological developments and persuasive marketing tech-
niques have made computers more popular in recent years,' and
as the use of computers has increased, so has the incidence of
software2 piracy. This Note describes the dilemma facing pro-
ducers of original software, examines the development of copy-
right protection for computer software, and explores the param-
eters of that protection by considering common problems in
copyright law applicable to computer software.
"Piracy" of software occurs most frequently in two situa-
tions. First, infringement occurs when software that is produced
by one company is copied and sold by another company or in-
corporated into the infringing company's products. Second, mis-
use occurs when lawful users of the program make unauthorized
copies of a particular program.
1. By 1987 sales of personal computer software are expected to reach $4.8 billion,
and sales of microcomputers are projected to reach $15 billion. Getting Tough on
Software Theft, Bus. Wa., May 31, 1982, at 28, 29.
2. The term "software" may be used to refer to computer programs, data bases, or
documentation. Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 Perspective, 7 W. NEw ENG. L.
REv. 405, 407 (1985). A "program" is a "set of precise instructions that tells the com-
puter how to solve a problem." Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1979)(citations omitted). For the statutory definition of "computer
program" and its history, see infra note 57 and accompanying text. A data base is a
grouping of information on which the machine performs its operations. Documentation
refers to the comments that are included in a program to explain its operation. Bender,
supra, at 407. This Note will use "software" to mean computer programs.
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A. Piracy by Competitors
The software age began in 1970 when International Busi-
ness Machines (IBM) began selling software and hardware 3 sep-
arately.4 Since its inception, investments in the software indus-
try have soared. According to one commentator, "More money is
spent on the development of software today than on any other
single technological asset."5 The same writer estimated the value
of domestic software in 1978 at over seventy billion dollars. One
of the leading microcomputer manufacturers, Apple Computer,
Inc., may have spent as much as fifty million dollars in research
and development of original software.7
The most crippling effect of competitor piracy is financial;
companies that invest large amounts of capital to develop origi-
nal software do not reap the projected benefits when competing
companies copy the programs and market them at a price below
that charged by the developing company. Franklin Computer
Corp., for example, copied programs developed by Apple and
was then able to sell them at four hundred dollars below the cost
of Apple's system.' Mail order companies have also hurt original
producers' business by selling pirated copies of software for as
little as half the cost of the original.' This severe competition in
the software market may have contributed to the depression ex-
perienced in the computer industry during 1985.10
3. "Hardware" is the term applied to physical equipment. Synercom Technology,
Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
4. Milgrim, Program Purloiners Doubly Deterred, DATAMATION, March 1983, at 158,
158. It is presumed that IBM was motivated by antitrust incentives to avoid a tying
arrangement. Id. In the industry, the separate offerings were referred to as "IBM's un-
bundling." See Bender, supra note 2, at 411.
5. Milgrim, supra note 4, at 158.
6. Id.
7. Getting Tough on Software Theft, supra note 1, at 28.
8. Id. at 28. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). See infra notes 104-31 and accom-
panying text.
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at D2, col. 1.
10. During the summer of 1985, Wang, Burroughs, and Hewlett-Packard announced
the layoffs of thousands of employees. Lueck, Boston Looks Past Computers, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1985, at D1, col. 3; Sanger, Computer Makers are Waiting to Hit Bot-
tom, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, at E7, col. 4; N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at D4, col. 6.
IBM suffered a 15% reduction in profits during the first half of 1985. After a summer
slump, the computer industry initiated a yearend Christmas campaign to boost fourth
quarter sales and salvage the year. Lewis, Guess What Computer Makers Want for
680 [Vol. 37
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Estimates of the marketshare that is lost to bootleggers
range from thirty to fifty percent.1 According to a Dallas-based
research firm, one pirated copy exists for every authorized copy
of business software, and piracy cost the software industry 1.3
billion dollars in lost revenues between 1981 and 1984.12
Software companies, in efforts to preserve their invest-
ments, have resorted to technological devices such as the "serial
number plan."'13 A manufacturer using this technique would in-
stall a unique serial number on each program, which could then
be used only in a machine with a corresponding serial number.
14
This method would be effective in curbing user piracy as well as
competitor piracy: 15 "Users would make unlimited back-up cop-
ies but could not pass them on because neither the machine nor
the software would operate unless the numbers matched."' 6 This
plan, however, presents at least two problems. First, new
software would be needed everytime the hardware was upgraded
or changed.' 7 Second, the bundling of hardware products with
software products might constitute a tying arrangement in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws because of its effect on competition
among other software producers. 8 Another proposed method of
deterrence would program popular software into computer chips
that would be installed in the hardware when sold.'9 Like the
serial number plan, however, this proposal might thwart compe-
tition and make upgrading hardware difficult.
For lack of a better remedy, computer companies have
turned to litigation to prevent copying of their software. In the
Christmas, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1985, at 44; Sanger, supra, at E7, col. 4. Early economic
indicators showed that the makers of personal computers "posted solid sales" during the
1985 fourth quarter. Sanger, Sales Held Stable on Computers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986,
at D1, col. 6.
11. Software Pirates-Wily Breed, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1982, at 104, 104; Braue,
Software Copying: Who's to Blame?, COMPUTER DEC., Feb. 26, 1985, at 16.
12. Smiddy & Smiddy, Caught in the Act, DATAMATION, June 15, 1985, at 102, 102.
13. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at D2, col. 1; Software Pirates-Wily Breed, supra
note 11, at 105.
14. N.Y. Times, supra note 13, at D2, col. 1.
15. User piracy is discussed infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
16. N.Y. Times, supra note 13, at D2, col. 1.
17. Id.
18. See generally Johnston, Product Bundling Faces Increased Specter of Illegality
Under the Antitrust Laws, THE COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1984, reprinted in COMPUTER LIT-
IGATION 1985: TRIAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 167 (1985).
19. N.Y. Times, supra note 13, at D2, col. 1.
1986]
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past few years, numerous complaints alleging copyright viola-
tions have been filed against competitors. Only a few, however,
have reached the trial stage. Three of these cases will be dis-
cussed below, 20 but more litigation can be expected unless com-
petitor piracy ceases.
B. Piracy by Users
A user pirate is one who is in legal possession of a program
and copies it, usually for his personal convenience. User piracy
often begins innocently, as the following excerpt from a data
processing trade magazine illustrates:
Your company has acquired a spreadsheet computer program
for the vice president of sales to use on his desktop pc [per-
sonal computer]. He keeps the program diskette on the book-
shelf in his office. An employee from across the hall borrows
the diskette the same way he would borrow a book. That em-
ployee then makes a copy of the diskette to use with his own
computer so he won't have to keep borrowing the vice presi-
dent's copy. He also makes a copy for the person at the next
desk to use on his pc, and another one that he mails to his
counterpart in one of the branch offices. Finally, the employee
makes an extra copy to take home so he can complete his cal-
culations on his own pc or let family members use it to do their
work.
21
Despite the seeming innocence of this misuse, producers of origi-
nal programs are taking a tough stand against their customers.22
For example, Lotus Development Corp., the nation's largest
manufacturer of software for personal computers,23 filed suit
20. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)(infra notes 104-31 and accompanying
text); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)(infra
notes 132-140 and accompanying text); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981)(infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text). In addition,
Microsoft Corp. of Washington sued Advanced Logic Systems, a California corporation,
for copyright violation in March 1981. In a suit against Data Equipment, Inc. in Novem-
ber 1981, Digital, Inc. and Micropro International Company won a $250,000 judgment
when Data Equipment admitted infringement. Getting Tough on Software Theft, supra
note 1, at 28.
21. Smiddy & Smiddy, supra note 12, at 102.
22. Id.
23. Lueck, supra note 10, at D6, col. 5.
[Vol. 37
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against its customer, Rixon Corporation, to prevent the unau-
thorized copying of Lotus computer programs for distribution to
Rixon's branch offices. 24 The suit was settled out of court "for an
undisclosed, but reportedly substantial amount.
'25
Lotus also sued The Health Group, Inc., alleging user piracy
by both the corporate entity and the manager of the corpora-
tion's data processing department.26 Lotus' apparent strategy is
to impose personal responsibility for infringement violations on
individuals within a corporation. 7
The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. (Adapso) has also developed a policy against user pirates. In
January 1985 Adapso teamed up with Micropro to sue American
Brands, Inc. and its subsidiary, the Wilson Jones Co., for unau-
thorized copying.28 This attack on software users is aimed at en-
forcing the producer's copyrights and informing the customers
that the producers are serious about preventing unauthorized
291copying.
Software producers are also developing techniques to deter
unauthorized customer copying. Adapso, for example, is consid-
ering the use of "keys" issued with purchased packages.
Mounted on one microcomputer would be "keyrings," which
could accomodate as many as sixteen "keyways," allowing the
operator to use many copy-protected packages simultaneously.
This approach has not yet been adopted, however, because of
fear that keyrings would be a burden to users. A less intrusive
alternative would be for the producer to collect a small fee for
each additional program user, 0 but since enforcement of this al-
ternative would be difficult, if not impossible, its value is
questionable.
The problem that software manufacturers face is twofold:
competitors pirate original products to sell as their own, and
24. Smiddy & Smiddy, supra note 12, at 102. Lotus sued Rixon Corp. of Maryland
for $10,000,000 for making and distributing unauthorized copies to their branch offices.
Lotus also sued The Health Group, Inc. of Tennessee on the same grounds and reached a
settlement for an undisclosed amount.
25. Id.
26. Braue, supra note 11, at 16.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Smiddy & Smiddy, supra note 12, at 102.
29. For statutorily authorized copying, see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
30. Vendors Step Up Anti-Copying Campaign, COMPUTER DEC., Feb. 26, 1985, at
1986] 683
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customers make and distribute unauthorized copies. Technologi-
cal devices may deter some software piracy, but judicial inter-
vention is necessary for lasting enforceable protection. Parts II
through V of this Note discuss the development of copyright
protection for software.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pursuant to article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitu-
tion, 31 Congress replaced the 1909 Copyright Act by enacting the
Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act).32 According to the 1976
Act, a work may be protected if it is "an original work of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. '33 The legisla-
tive history of section 102 states that the "two fundamental cri-
teria of copyright protection. .. [are] originality and fixation in
tangible form. '3 4 According to section 102, works of authorship
include the following: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, in-
cluding any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including
any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound record-
ings."35 The legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that the
category of "literary works," as defined in section 101,-6 includes
"computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent
that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression
of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.
'37
The requirement of fixation is met if the work "can be per-
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 empowers Congress to lay and collect taxes as neces-
sary "[t]o promote the progress of sciences and useful acts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
32. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-603 (1982)).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
34. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). This list, however, is not intended to be exclusive. For
an explanation of "including," see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) defines "literary works" as "works, other than audiovisual
works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied."
37. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Congress 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667.
[Vol. 37
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ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device.""8 The medium involved
need not be of any particular form. The expression may be "in
words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures and any other graphic
or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in
written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or
any other stable form. '39 Section 102 specifically states that a
protected expression may be "perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. '40 The legislative history of the 1976 Act, however,
also indicates that fixation may not be achieved if the expression
is merely "captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a
computer." 41
Subsection (b) of section 102 provides that copyright pro-
tection extends only to the expression of an original work and
does not extend to the underlying ideas on which the expression
may be based.42 The legislative history reveals concern over the
extension of copyright protection of a computer program to the
"methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather
than merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas. '43 The legisla-
tive history also repeats that the purpose of section 102 is to
limit protection to the "expression" adopted by the program-
mer.44 Although the 1976 Act does not specifically provide copy-
right protection for computer programs, it may be implied from
the legislative intent.
45
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). By using broad language, Congress intended to avoid
problems created by cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908). The Court in White-Smith held that a piano roll was not a copy of the musical
composition because it was not in a form that others could easily "see and read." See 1
M, NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B][1] (1983).
39. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5667.
42. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670.
44. Id.
45. Although it may appear that Congress intended to protect computer programs,
1986]
7
Matthews: Copyrightability of Software: Piracy on the Waters of Protection
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
686 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
In 1974, in preparation for passage of the 1976 Act, Con-
gress created a National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)4 6 to study, inter alia, the
use of copyrighted works in computers.47 After three years of
study, CONTU submitted its final report, in which it suggested
three changes affecting software copyright. First, CONTU sug-
gested amending the 1976 Act "to make it explicit that com-
puter programs, to the extent that they embody an author's
original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright.
'48
CONTU also proposed that the law be amended "to apply to all
computer uses of copyrighted programs . . . and . . to ensure
that rightful possessors of copies of computer programs can use
or adapt these copies for their use."'49 To achieve these objec-
tives, CONTU recommended amending section 101 of the copy-
right law to include a definition of "computer program" and
drafting a new section 117.50
Because Congress had initially recognized the need to ad-
dress computer copyright problems in 1976, but was uncertain of
the appropriate method, the original version of section 117
provided:
CONTU's first priority was to make the intent explicit.
46. The commission was a distinguished group, composed of the following members:
John Hersey, president of the Authors League of America, Inc.; Dan Lacy, senior vice-
president of McGraw-Hill, Inc.; E. Gabriel Perle, vice-president of law for Time, Inc.;
Hershel B. Sarbin, president of Ziff-Davis Pub. Co.; Arthur R. Miller, professor of law at
Harvard Law School; Robert Wedgeworth, executive director of the American Library
Assoc.; Alice E. Wilcox, director of Minnesota Interlibrary Telecommunications Ex-
change; George D. Cary, retired register of Copyrights and career affiliate of Copyright
Office; Stanley H. Fuld, former chief judge of the state of New York and the New York
Court of Appeals; Daniel Boorstin, Librarian of Congress; Barbara A. Ringer, Register of
Copyrights in the Library of Congress; Rhoda H. Karpatkin, executive director of Con-
sumers Union, publisher of Consumer Reports; and Melville B. Nimmer, professor of law
at the University of California at Los Angeles Law School. FINAL REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 4, 107-109
(1979)[hereinafter cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT]. For a critical view of the Commis-
sion and its proposals, see Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663.
47. Specifically, the Commission was empowered "to study and compile data on the
reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship ... in conjunction with auto-
matic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information
.... and to make recommendations as to such changes in copyright law or procedures
that may be necessary." Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
48. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 12.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116
and 118, this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in
a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of
the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of
storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or
in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process,
than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or
the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December
31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an ac-
tion brought under this title.
5 1
Thus, this section "provided that the law on the use of copy-
righted works in computer systems would be unaffected by its
enactment. '5 2 The purpose of section 117 was to preserve the
"status quo" until CONTU concluded its study and filed its final
report.1
3
CONTU concluded that section 117, as written, made "clear
that the placement of any copyright work into a computer is the
preparation of a copy and, therefore, a potential infringement of
copyright. ' 54 To provide that persons in lawful possession of
copies of programs could use them without fear of infringement,
CONTU drafted a new version of section 117, which provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the rightful possessor of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival
purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the
event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise trans-
ferred, along with the copy from which such copies were pre-
51. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 117, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (1976).
52. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 4.
53. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5731; accord Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,
480 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
54. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 12.
1986]
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pared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all
rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be trans-
ferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.55
Congress adopted CONTU's proposed changes almost verba-
tim.50 In 1980 Congress amended section 101 to include a defini-
tion of "computer program"'  and repealed old section 117 re-
placing it with the version proposed in the CONTU report.58
Although a copyrighted program generally may not be du-
plicated without the developer's permission, the current version
of section 117 provides two exceptions to this rule. First, the
user may load a program into the internal memory of the com-
puter to use it. "At the time of use, there are two copies of the
program: the one in the diskette and the one executing in mem-
ory. 1 9 Section 117 specifically provides that the copy in memory
is not an infringing copy. The second exception provides that
one in rightful possession may prepare archival copies to guard
against destruction, but may not sell some copies, while retain-
ing others.6 If the rightful possessor sells copies of a program,
the sale "must be of all rights in the program, thus creating a
new rightful possessor and destroying that status as regards the
seller."61
Although Congress adopted all of the CONTU proposals,
CONTU was not in unanimous agreement about the degree of
protection that should be accorded computer programs.62 In a
concurring opinion, Commissioner Nimmer stated that the ma-
jority's proposals were "open-ended" to the point that "if 'liter-
55. Id. For a discussion of § 117 and its history, see Stern, Section 117 of the Copy-
right Act: Charter of the Software Users' Rights or an Illusing Promise, 7 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 459 (1985).
56. In the version of § 117 that Congress adopted, "rightful possessor" was changed
to "owners." See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
57. The new definition states: "[A] 'computer program' is a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about cer-
tain results." Id. § 101 (1982).
58. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482.
59. Smiddy & Smiddy, supra note 12, at 104.
60. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 13. Users who distribute copies should
not try to use § 117 as a shield to legitimize their infringement. Distributing copies goes
beyond actions necessary to guard against complete destruction. See 17 U.S.C. § 117
(1982).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
62. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 12.
[Vol. 37
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ary works' are to be so broadly construed, the Copyright Act be-
comes a general misappropriation law."'63 According to Nimmer,
the constitutionality of the majority's proposals could be chal-
lenged because such an approach arguably stretches the meaning
of 'authors' and 'writing' beyond constitutional limits."4 He con-
cluded that the CONTU proposals might be "unduly restrictive"
and proposed his own "demarcation which would distinguish be-
tween protectible and nonprotectible software.
'6 5
Nimmer proposed that copyright protection for software be
limited "to those computer programs which produce works
which themselves qualify for copyright protection."66 As an illus-
tration of this proposal he suggested that "[a] program designed
for use with a database. . . would clearly be copyrightable since
the resulting selection and arrangement of items from such
database would be copyrightable as a compilation. 6 7 For in-
stance, programs designed for use in conjunction with legal in-
formation or a computer game would be copyrightable since the
result or output would constitute, respectively, an enumeration
of cases or an audiovisual work, each entitled to copyright pro-
tection. Nimmer suggested that these protected programs differ
from a program that controls the flow of traffic, which would
"not be eligible for copyright because its operations do not result
in copyrightable works. '6 8 Analogyzing this medium to sound re-
cordings, Nimmer concluded: "[T]he operation of the sound re-
cording produces a musical work which itself is copyrightable.
That is sufficient to render the sound recording itself copyright-
able quite apart from the separate copyright in the musical
work." 19 Nimmer thus proposed to disregard the form of the
program and look exclusively to the result of the program's op-
eration. He acknowledged, however, that his suggestion, al-
though useful for future implementation, might not be appropri-
ate at present.
70
63. Id. at 26.
64. Id. For a discussion of the historical uses of copyright, see the dissent of Com-
missioner Hersey, id. at 27.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
19861 689
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The majority considered and specifically rejected Nimmer's
proposal:
It has been suggested by Vice-President Nimmer in his sepa-
rate opinion that programs be copyrighted only when their use
leads to copyrighted output.. . . This distinction is not consis-
tent with the design of the Act of 1976, which was clearly to
protect all works of authorship from the moment of their fixa-
tion in any tangible medium of expression. Further, it does not
square with copyright practice past and present which recog-
nizes copyright protection for a work of authorship regardless
of the uses to which it may be put. The copyright status of the
written rules for a game or a system for the operation of a ma-
chine is unaffected by the fact that those rules direct the ac-
tions of those who play the game or carry out the process. Nor
has copyright been denied to works simply because of their
utilitarian aspects. It follows, therefore, that there should like-
wise be no distinction made between programs which are used
in the production of further copyrighted works and those
which are not.
7 1
Commissioner Hersey, in a dissenting opinion,7 2 recom-
mended that "[t]he Act of 1976 should be amended to explicitly
state that copyright protection does not extend to a computer
program capable of being used to control computer opera-
tions. ' '73 According to Hersey, a "[computer] program itself, in
its mature and usable form, is a machine control element, a
mechanical device, which on Constitutional grounds and for rea-
sons of social policy ought not to be copyrighted. 7 4 Hersey
maintained that since protection for computer programs existed
or would exist in other areas of law, copyright protection was not
needed and, if given, would have negative social and economic
consequences. 5
Hersey conceded that the products of preparatory stages of
71. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
72. Commissioner Hersey's dissent persuaded Commissioner Karpatkin to dissent as
well. Id. at 38.
73. Id. at 1. He suggested three possible boundaries for copyright protection: "(1)
the moment of transformation from 'source' to 'object' program; (2) the moment of input
into a computer or micro-processor; or (3) at the point where a program goes from 'natu-
ral language' . . . to higher-level, formal computer language." Id. at 37.
74, Id. at 27.
75, Id. at 27-28.
[Vol. 37
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programming, such as flowcharting and source code, 6 are "writ-
ings," but argued that a computer program in its mature phase
is a mechanical device that, when activated, performs a task.
77
To stress the instructional nature of programs, he analogized a
computer program to a motorized cam: "A cam, like a mature
computer program is the objectification of a series of instruc-
tions: 'Up, down, up, down . . .' or 'In, out, in, out . . ' ",8
Both embody instructions that result in the production of work
and both were originally "conceptualized, described, and written
out as . . [a] series of instructions. 7 9 Hersey also implied that
it would be ludicrous for anyone to suggest, as they had for com-
puter programs, that a cam is "a literary work" deserving copy-
right protection. 0
Hersey's dissent voiced two fundamental disagreements
with the majority. First, he argued that because copyright pro-
tection has never been extended to a form of expression that is
not perceivable by the human senses,81 it should not be ex-
tended to computer programs. Second, he expressed fear that
the majority's proposals extended protection beyond the expres-
sion to the underlying idea.
2
III. CASE LAW CONCERNING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
SOFTWARE
The Commission's proposals and the subsequent 1980
amendments to the 1976 Act have provided substantial guidance
for courts considering claims of software infringement. Two cir-
cuit courts of appeal have interpreted the recent changes to
mean that virtually all computer programs are entitled to pro-
tection. 1 A review of those two cases, and others that preceded
them, will reveal the development and current level of copyright
76. For an explanation of "source code," see infra note 86.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 29-30.
81. Id. at 32-33, 36-37.
82. Id. at 33.
83. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)(infra notes 104-31 and accompanying text);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)(infra notes 132-
40 and accompanying text).
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protection available for computer software.
One of the first cases considering copyright infringement of
a computer program was Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc.14 In Data Cash the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant infringed its copyright on a computer chess game by market-
ing an identical game. Apparently, the third party that devel-
oped the plaintiff's game duplicated for the defendants the
plaintiff's ROM,8 5 which contained the program in its object
code form.8s The plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary in-
junction and the defendant sought summary judgment . 7 The
court ruled that section 117, as it existed in its original form,
precluded the use of the 1976 Act to protect the alleged copy-
right. The court relied, therefore, solely on the 1909 Act and
common-law copyright provisions.8 8
Although the court found that the object programs in both
products were identical 9 and, therefore, assumed that copying
had occurred,90 it found no infringement because the medium to
84. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. IM. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1980).
85. The ROM (Read Only Memory) is an internal permanent memory device, con-
sisting of a semi-conductor "chip," that is incorporated into the circuitry of the com-
puter. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (1983).
86. There was no copyright notice on the ROM, but the copyright notice did appear
on the source program. 480 F. Supp. at 1066. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984), the court pro-
vided the following explanation of the terms "object code" and "source code":
There are three levels of computer language in which computer programs may
be written. High level language, such as commonly used BASIC or FORTRAN,
uses English words and symbols, and is relatively easy to learn and understand
(e.g. "Go to 40" tells the computer to skip intervening steps and go to the step
at line 40). A somewhat lower level language is assembly language, which con-
sists of alphanumeric labels (e.g. "ADC" means "add with carry"). Statements
in high level language and apparently also statements in assembly language,
are referred to as written in "source code." The third, or lowest level computer
language, is machine language, a binary language using two symbols, 0 and 1,
to indicate an open or closed switch (e.g. "01101001" means, to the Apple, add
two numbers and save the result). Statements in machine language are referred
to as written in "object code."
Id. at 1243. For a brief, but clear explanation of computer programs terminology, see
Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1723,
1724-26 (1983).
87. 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
88. Id. at 1067.
89. The defendant stipulated that its chess computer program was identical to the
plaintiff's. Id. at 1066 n. 3.
90. Id. at 1066.
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which the program was copied did not constitute a "copy." Ac-
cording to the court, "Both at common law and under the 1909
Act, a 'copy' must be in a form which others can see and read."9 1
The court found that the ROM could not be seen or read by
others and, thus, was not a copy. 2 The court also found that
"[i]n its object phase, the ROM, the computer program is a
mechanical tool or a machine part but it is not a 'copy' of the
source program."93 As a result, the court concluded that the de-
fendant's program, which was embodied in the ROM, did not
infringe upon the plaintiff's copyright and granted the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. 4
In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,95 the
defendant also made a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's copy-
right infringement claims, but the court denied the motion. The
defendant argued that when a computer program is stored on a
silicon chip, a copy of the chip does not infringe the program
that is embodied on the chip. According to Tandy, the defend-
ant had copied the Tandy TRS-80 compiler program and then
91. Id. at 1068.
92. Id. at 1069. To reach its conclusion under the 1909 Act, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co., 209 U.S.
1 (1908)(piano roll for player piano found not to be a copy of the musical composition
contained on it). The object program, like the piano roll, was not in a form that could be
seen or read with the naked eye and, thus, was found not to be a copy. 480 F. Supp. at
1069. According to the court, the common-law definition of copy is "that which comes so
near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original."
Id. at 1068 (footnotes omitted). The court analogized a ROM to a building that is built
according to architectural plans. The court concluded that an architectural plan is a
writing that can be copied, but a building built pursuant to the plans is not a "copy" of
the plans. Id.
93. 480 F. Supp. at 1069 (footnote omitted). See supra note 92.
94. The Data Cash court has been criticized for its misuse of terminology and con-
fusion of object code with the ROM in which it is embodied. See generally D. BENDER,
COMPUTER LAW, § 4.04[1], at 4-22 to -23 (1983). The court also misapplied the definition
of "copies" found in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See supra note 38 and accompanying
text. According to the court, "[E]ven if the 1976 Act did apply, copying of the ROM
would not be actionable." 480 F. Supp. at 1066 n. 4. The legislative history of § 102,
however, expressly provides that the seeing and reading requirement enunciated in
White-Smith is to be rejected. See supra note 38. On appeal the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed on other grounds. Since the lower court's rationale was not argued or briefed by
either side, the appellate court did not consider it. 628 F.2d at 1041. See generally 2 M.
NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.08 n. 18 (stating that the Seventh Circuit implicitly rejected
the district court's reasoning).
95. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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used it in its own computer.96 The court found that the program
was of a copyrightable nature and in a fixed form on the chip.
7
Disagreeing with the Data Cash court, the Tandy court con-
cluded that a chip is a "copy" within the meaning of sections
101 and 102 of the 1976 Act and that, therefore, the program
was within the copyright provisions of section 102.11
In GCA Corp. v. Chance,9 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California considered whether the
"object code" version of a program is protected when the
"source code" version 00 has been registered and properly copy-
righted. The court granted GCA's motion for a preliminary in-
junction based on GCA's prima facie showing of a valid copy-
right of the source code, Chance's access to the copyrighted
works, and Chance's admission that it had copied the operating
programs.' 0 ' According to the court, because the object code is
merely a different version of the source code, "the two are to be
treated as one work.' 0 2 Thus, when the source code is pro-
tected, so is the object code. 03
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,0
Apple sought to enforce its copyrights of operating systems pro-
grams'05 that were expressed in object code. 06 The Court of Ap-
96. Id. at 173.
97. Id. Additionally, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss because the
plaintiff suggested that the chip might have been duplicated by first copying the
printout or the visual display. Id. at 175. According to the court, if proven, "there can be
no doubt that the unauthorized duplication of a visually displayed copy of the program
would fall within the reach of the federal copyright laws." Id.
98. 524 F. Supp. at 174-75.
99. 1982 Copyright L. Dec. 25,464, at 17,763 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
100. For an explanation of "object code" and "source code," see supra note 86.
101. 1982 Copyright L. Dec. at 17,764-65. The court stated that to prevail on the
copyright infringement claim, the "plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a valid copy-
right; (2) access to the copyrighted works; and (3) copying by showing substantial simi-
larity as to the general idea contained in the works." Id. (citing Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)).
102. 1982 Copyright L. Dec. at 17,765.
103. Id.
104. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), cert. dis-
missed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The suit was settled before the Supreme Court acted on
defendant's petition for certiorari. See Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1984, at 10.
105. Most programs fall into one of two general categories. "Application programs"
perform a specific task for the user, such as updating a file or printing a list. "Operating
systems programs" generally manage the internal functions of the computer or facilitate
use of application programs.
106. 714 F.2d at 1243. For an explanation of "object code," see supra note 86.
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peals for the Third Circuit addressed two issues: whether com-
puter programs expressed in object code are copyrightable and
whether an operating systems program is entitled to copyright
protection.
10 7
Franklin manufactured the ACE 100 personal computer
and, in order to make the ACE 100 more marketable, designed it
to be "Apple compatible."108 Thus, the software designed for
Apple computers could also be used in ACE 100. Franklin did
not deny that it had copied Apple's programs,10 9 but claimed to
have done so to ensure Apple compatibility.110 Apple alleged
that Franklin was liable for patent infringement, unfair competi-
tion, misappropriation, and copyright infringement of fourteen
of Apple's computer programs. Franklin asserted, as an affirma-
tive defense, that the Apple programs were not copyrightable
subject matter."' The district court denied Apple's original mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Franklin from in-
fringing the copyrights Apple held for certain computer
programs.
Three days after the date of the district court's order, the
Third Circuit decided Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Inter-
national, Inc.11 2 In Williams Electronics the court considered
the copyrightability of a computer program for a video game
that was embodied in a ROM"' and concluded that "the
copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established after
the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act. 114 The court then
held that Artic had failed to show "any persuasive reason which
would overcome the statutory presumption of validity of the
107. Id. at 1246. For a complete discussion of the case, see Note, Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. Puts the Byte Back into Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, 14 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 281 (1984); Note, Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 29 VH.L. L. REv. 894 (1984).
108. 714 F.2d at 1243.
109. Id. at 1245. An Apple systems programmer testified that Franklin must have
copied because "it is 'almost impossible for so many lines of code' to be identically writ-
ten," and because the Franklin master disk contained his name and another word that
he had embedded in certain Apple programs. Id.
110. Id. at 1243.
111. Id. at 1244.
112. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). The Franklin order and opinion were dated July
30, 1982. 714 F.2d at 1245. Williams Electronics was decided on Aug. 2, 1982. 685 F.2d at
870.
113. For a definition of "ROM," see supra note 85.
114. 685 F.2d at 875.
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[computer program's] copyright registration ' 115 and affirmed the
grant of an injunction against Artic. In light of the Williams
Electronics decision, Apple petitioned the district court to re-
consider its claim. The court denied Apple's motion for recon-
sideration, and Apple appealed.
1 6
Replying to Franklin's first assertion, that object code is not
proper copyright subject matter, the court of appeals stated that
there was "no basis in the statute for any such concern." 17 After
an examination of the Copyright Act's legislative history and of
the CONTU Report, the court concluded that "a computer pro-
gram, whether in object code or source code, is a 'literary work'
and is protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its
object or source code version. 18
Franklin also claimed "that computer operating systems
programs, as distinguished from application programs, are not
the proper subject of copyright 'regardless of the language or
medium in which they are fixed."'1 9 Franklin contended that
systems programs are not copyrightable because they are either
a "process," "system," or "method of operation" and section
102(b) of the Act states that copyright protection does not ex-
tend to "any idea, procedure, process, [or] system."-2 0 After not-
ing that Franklin had raised an issue of first impression,1 21 the
court concluded that Apple was not claiming copyright protec-
tion to the underlying process, but only to the expression of the
instructions. The court also noted that the distinction Franklin
sought to make was difficult to reconcile with its concession that
application programs are copyrightable subject matter. Since
only the computer instructions were protected, the court could
115. Id. at 877.
116. 714 F.2d at 1245.
117. Id at 1247. The copyrightability of object code was also at issue in Hubco Data
Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983).
Hubco developed a procedure for altering the memory and function capabilities of sys-
tems installed by Management Assistance, Inc. (MAI). Id. at 452. In issuing a prelimi-
nary injunction against Hubco, the court relied on Williams Electronics and the
CONTU final report to find that an object code is copyrightable. 219 U.S.P.Q. at 454.
118. 714 F.2d at 1249 (footnotes omitted). The court based its decision on the statu-
tory definition of literary works, see supra note 36, and a provision in the CONTU Re-
port majority opinion stating that "object codes are proper subjects of copyright." 714
F.2d at 1248.
119. Id. at 1249 (citing Brief of Appellee at 15).
120. Id. at 1250-51.
121. Id. at 1250.
696 [Vol. 37
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not distinguish between "instructions in an operating system
program ... [and] the instructions in an application pro-
gram.,
122
The court also rejected Franklin's argument that the pro-
gram becomes an actual part of the machine and, thus, should
not be protected. The court cited the CONTU report and the
Commission's conclusion that programs are not machine parts,
just as video tapes are not part of the video machine, and con-
cluded that the program does not become part of the machine.
123
Franklin also challenged the copyrightability of the pro-
grams because of the utilitarian nature of operating systems."2 "
The court, however, cited the Supreme Court's statement, in
Mazer v. Stein,125 that the intended use of an article should not
determine copyrightability and the CONTU majority's opinion
that the use of a program to perform a process does not affect
copyrightability 26 and rejected this argument as well.
12 7
Finally, Franklin argued that extending protection to sys-
tems programs would constitute protection of an idea. The de-
fendant cited Mazer v. Stein'28 and section 102(b) of the 1976
Act for the proposition that copyright protection extends only to
the expression of the idea, not the idea itself, and argued that
systems programs are, therefore, not copyrightable.129 The court
responded by formulating the following test to distinguish the
expression of a systems program from the underlying idea: "If
other programs can be written or created which perform the
same function as an Apple's operating system program, then
that program is an expression of the idea and hence, copyright-
able." 130 Therefore, to prove that a systems program is copy-
rightable, a party need only present competitors' products that
are written differently, but perform the same functions. The
court instructed the district court to make findings regarding the
122. Id. at 1251.
123. Id. (citing CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 21).
124. Id. The argument that "purely utilitarian works" are not proper copyright sub-
ject matter was derived from dicta in Baker v. Seldin, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
125. 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
126. 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 21).
127. 714 F.2d at 1252.
128. 347 U.S. at 217.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) states: "[C]opyright protection... [does not] extend
to any idea."
130. 714 F.2d at 1253 (citing Dymow v. Bulton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d. Cir. 1926)).
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existence of other programs if the issue was pressed on
remand.
3 1
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,
32
Formula appealed from the district court's grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting Formula from copying, distributing,
or selling Apple's copyrighted computer programs and from us-
ing the name "Pineapple" as its trademark or trade name. The
computer programs at issue in Formula were operating systems
programs 133 that were registered pursuant to the 1976 Copyright
Act.134 Formula conceded that its programs were substantially
similar to Apple's, 35 but asserted that "because . . . [the sys-
tems programs] control the internal operation of the computer,
[they] are only 'ideas' or 'processes,' and therefore, unlike appli-
cation programs, . . . are not protected by copyright.'1
36
Formula also claimed that under the idea/expression dichotomy,
"a computer program is protected under the Copyright Act only
if the program embodies expression which is communicated to
the user when the program is run on a computer.'
1 37
The court of appeals found Formula's claims contrary to the
language of the Copyright Act, its legislative history, and the ex-
isting case law. 38 After reviewing the CONTU report, including
Nimmer's and Hersey's separate opinions, the court concluded
that the 1976 Act "makes no distinction between the copyright-
ability of those programs which directly interact with the com-
puter user and those which simply manage the computer sys-
tem."'13 The court ruled that the idea/expression argument
failed because the idea involved could be expressed in numerous
ways and Apple merely "[sought] to copyright. . . its particular
set of instructions, not the underlying computer process."'4
The trend for the past few years has clearly been to broaden
131. 714 F.2d at 1253.
132. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). For a
thorough treatment of this case, see Case Comment, Copyright Law-Computer Pro-
grams, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 457 (1985).
133. For an explanation of "operating systems programs," see supra note 105.
134. 725 F.2d at 523.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 524.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 525.
140. Id.
[Vol. 37
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the scope of protection for computer programs. After the Frank-
lin and Formula decisions, it appears that application and sys-
tems programs are copyrightable in both object and source code
forms.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT OF SYSTEMS
PROGRAMS
Although the Third and Ninth circuits' opinions were well
reasoned and appear consistent with the majority opinion in the
CONTU report, their treatment of systems programs did not
promote the purpose underlying the copyright laws. The pri-
mary purpose of copyright is to ensure "that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will
be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the ex-
clusive rights to their writings."' 41 Rights are granted to authors
"primarily for the benefit of the public; ' copyright "makes re-
ward to the owner a secondary consideration.
1
1
3
It is difficult to imagine how the public is benefitted by the
protection of a systems program that activates the machine or
one that checks for memory capacity and then prints the word
"Hello." Yet these are some of the systems programs the Ninth
and Second Circuits decided to protect in Apple v. Franklin
4 4
and Apple v. Formula.145 In trying to draw a definitive line, the
courts may have gone too far. Society is benefitted only slightly
when systems programs are protected. In.the software industry's
current condition, small producers appear to be experiencing
some difficulty competing with the major, traditional leaders.
Because the small producers must spend time repeating the ini-
tial steps, society is deprived of the fruits of their intellectual
labor. Society would benefit more if producers were permitted to
use established systems programs as a foundation to produce
more elaborate programs. Consumers would also benefit because
141. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATwE
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT S1, S7 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976).
142. Id. See also M. NiMMER, supra note 38, § 1.03[A] (citing Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
143. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)(quoting United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
144. See supra notes 104-31 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
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the systems programs would be designed to operate in more
than one company's computer system and, thus, would increase
the amount of flexibility allowed to consumers.
Although the value of copyrighting individual systems pro-
grams may be questionable, the value increases significantly
when the systems program is combined with others or is part of
an entire package of software. Determining the limits of
copyrightability for systems programs is a difficult, but desirable
goal. Although piracy should not be endorsed or encouraged,
some flexibility should be allowed so that producers will not
have to reinvent the wheel with every project.
One possible solution would be to adopt a method like that
suggested by Nimmer in his concurring opinion in the CONTU
Report. Alternatively, the courts could reconsider the arguments
presented in Franklin that a systems program is a "process,"
''system," or "method of operation." Perhaps systems programs
that merely perform a function within the machine should be
considered a process or method of operation, even though such a
distinction might prove difficult to draw.
V. PARAMETERS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Developers and users of software have received substantial
guidance both from the statutory provisions for the copyright-
ability of computer programs and the judicial decisions which
have held that programs, whether in object or source code 146 and
regardless of their function, are copyrightable. Nevertheless,
some questions remain regarding the practical application of the
provisions.
A. The Feasibility and Need for Other Methods of
Protection
Over the years, protection of computer programs has as-
sumed various forms. In addition to copyright, legal theories de-
rived from patent and trade secret law have also been used to
protect software producers.
146. For an explanation of "source code" and object code, see supra note 86.
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1. Patent Protection
Under federal law, patents may protect "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacturer, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof."'147 A patent may be
issued to protect a novel invention,4 8 as long as the subject mat-
ter is not obvious "to a person having ordinary skill in the
art.' 49 The patentability of computer programs has been the
subject of some dispute.
In Gottschalk v. Benson,150 the Supreme Court held that a
program for a digital computer, which converted decimal num-
bers into pure binary numbers, was not a patentable "process."
The Court explicitly stated that the decision did not preclude "a
patent for any program servicing a computer,"' 5 ' but "the scope
of the decision remained far from clear.
' 152
The Supreme Court again considered the patentability of
computer programs in Parker v. Flook. 53 In that case the Court
rejected Flook's application to patent a program that updated
alarm limits during catalytic conversions because "[tihe only
novel feature of the method [was] a mathematical formula.'
' 54
The Flook decision "did little, if anything, to settle the issue of
whether computer programs were patentable.'
' 55
The cloud of confusion cleared somewhat in 1981 when the
Supreme Court decided Diamond v. Diehr. 56 The applicant in
Diehr sought a patent for a process that collected temperatures,
input the data into a computer, and monitored mold presses to
ensure the successful curing of synthetic rubber. 157 In a five to
four decision, the Court found for the patent applicant even
though "in several steps of the process a mathematical equation
147. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
148. Id. § 102.
149. Id. § 103.
150. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
151. Id. at 71.
152. Note, The Status of Patent Law Concerning Computer Programs: The Proper
Form for Legal Protection, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 155, 163 (1983).
153. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
154. Id. at 585.
155. Anthony & Colwel, Litigating the Validity and Infringement of Software Pat-
ents, 41 WASH. & LFE L. REV. 1307, 1316 (1984).
156. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
157. Id. at 178.
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and a programmed digital computer [were] used. 1 58 The Court
distinguished Diehr from Benson and Flook by noting that
Diehr did not seek to patent a mathematical formula. 159 The
Court did not determine whether a computer program alone
would be patentable, but did state that the use of a computer
does not transform an otherwise patentable process into unpat-
entable subject matter.
160
Although the Supreme Court has apparently cleared the
way for patent protection of computer programs, this method of
protection is not without its drawbacks. One common complaint
is that the patent process is expensive and lengthy: 6' securing a
patent may cost as much as 100,000 dollars, 62 and the period
between "filing a patent application and issue of a patent typi-
cally exceeds two years.' 6 3 This delay is particularly trouble-
some for software protection since a program may well be obso-
lete by the time a patent is issued.6 In addition, it is difficult to
predict whether a particular programmable process is patentable
subject matter 6 5 or to police unlawful use of patents, which are
public documents. 66
2. Trade Secret Protection
Because copyright protection is limited to the tangible ex-
pression of an idea and does not extend to the underlying idea
itself,167 producers of software often combine copyright protec-
tion with trade secret protection.6 8 Trade secret law goes fur-
ther than copyright to protect ideas themselves, regardless of
158. Id. at 185.
159. Id. at 187.
160. Id.
161. See Posch, Protect Your Software: Trade Secrets, Copyrights, Patents, DIRECT
MARKETING, Oct. 1984, at 190.
162. Bender, supra note 2, at 418 n. 62 (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).
164. Posch, supra note 161, at 190.
165. Bender, supra note 2, at 418.
166. Id.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
168. See Bender, supra note 2, at 433-38; Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for
the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REv. 563, 573-77 (1985);
Milgrim, supra note 4, at 158; Posch, supra note 161, at 194. In fact, trade secret protec-
tion is the most popular method of protecting software. Bender, supra note 2, at 433
(footnote omitted).
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the manner of expression.'69 According to comment b to section
757 of the Restatement of Torts, a trade secret "may consist of
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know
or use it,'1" °o so long as it remains secret. 1 '
Software is certainly within the scope of trade secret protec-
tion, and "the scope of protection seems reasonably clear."'172
Trade secrets, however, must be kept confidential. To maintain
the secrecy necessary for trade secret protection, software pro-
ducers usually distribute their programs pursuant to licensing
agreements that prohibit use or disclosure of the software be-
yond necessary limits.
1 73
In the past a major problem with the use of trade secrecy to
protect computer programs was uncertainty whether the 1976
Copyright Act preempts trade secret protection under state law.
Section 301(a) of the Act provides in part:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as speci-
fied by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,...
are governed exclusively by this title .... [N]o person is enti-
tled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any state.
174
Section 301 further expresses a legislative intent not to annul or
limit "any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes
of any state with respect to .. .subject matter that does not
169. M. Bryce & Assocs. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 319 N.W.2d 907, cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982).
170. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
171. Id.
172. Bender, supra note 2, at 434.
173. Conley & Bryan, supra note 168, at 575. In policing the use of trade secrets,
producers should be careful to devote the time and effort needed to protect the secrets.
Posch, supra note 161, at 196. One commentator has suggested that the following proce-
dure be used: (1) every document should be marked with a warning notice, (2) circula-
tion of classified documents should be limited, (3) employees should be educated about
the importance of maintaining secrecy, (4) employees should sign a nondisclosure agree-
ment, and (5) measures should be adopted to control and restrict access to the docu-
ments. Id.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
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come within the subject matter of copyright as specified in sec-
tions 102 and 103 '117 5 nor to protect "activities violating legal or
equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by sec-
tion 106. ''117 According to the CONTU report, "The availability
of copyright for computer programs does not, of course, affect
the availability of trade secrecy protection. Under the Copyright
Act of 1976 only those state rights that are equivalent to the
exclusive rights granted therein (generally, common law copy-
right) are preempted.' 77 Thus, federal copyright law should not
preempt state laws'providing trade secret protection.
Trade secret protection provides a number of advantages
for software producers. These include the availability of prelimi-
nary injunctions, the clear applicability of protection, the wide
range of protectible subject matter, the limited opportunity for
misuse resulting from restricted circulation of the knowledge,
the absence of any waiting period, and the potentially limitless
duration of protection. 17 8 Reliance on trade secret law, however,
is not without its disadvantages. First, software producers must
bear the burden of developing a trade secret protection sys-
tem1 79 and risk immediate loss of protection should the secret be
released. 180 Intellectually, "the necessary fact of secrecy is itself
a bar to progress in the sense that when knowledge is not widely
proliferated, improvements and further advances based on it are
fewer."""
Some commentators view trade secret protection as the best
method to "protect the program without sacrificing copyright
protection or divulging the idea. 1 82 The advantages of combin-
ing the copyright and trade secret protection are twofold. First,
175. Id. § 301(b)(1).
176. Id. § 301(b)(3).
177. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 18 (footnote omitted). See also H.R.
Rep. No. 96-1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6460, 6482. Accord Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F.
Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Contra Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp.
1471 (D.C. Nev. 1983).
178. D. BENDER, supra note 94, § 4A.01[5], at 4A-16.
179. See Posch, supra note 161, at 190; Bender, supra note 2, at 438.
180. D. BENDER, supra note 94, § 4A.01[5], at 4A-17.
181. Id.
182. Milgrim, supra note 4, at 160. See also Posch, supra note 161, at 190; Vis-
serman & Moran, Legal Protection of Computer Software, 71 ILL. B. J. 608 (1983).
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"protection of the software as a trade secret safeguards the un-
derlying ideas through the use of contractual licensing and re-
lated techniques. Layering on copyright protection as well pro-
vides protection from third-party recipients who have not signed
agreements restricting use or disclosure.' 1 83 Second, the statu-
tory remedies provided by the copyright law provide "meaning-
ful deterrent[s]. '' 84
B. The Threat of Infringement and the Burdens of Proof
The holder of a copyright has the exclusive rights to
reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, and
to perform and display the copyrighted work.185 Infringement
occurs when any of the exclusive rights are violated. 186 To prove
infringement, the plaintiff must show (1) the validity of the
copyright and (2) the existence of copying. 87 Under section
410(c) of the 1976 Act, a certificate of copyright registration con-
stitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright." 188
Once the plaintiff has established the prima facie validity of the
copyright, the burden shifts to the defendant to overcome the
presumption of validity.'89 The existence of copying may be in-
ferred if the plaintiff shows that the defendant had access to the
infringed work and that the original and the allegedly infringing
work are substantially similar.19
Showing access to the software is usually not difficult. In
183. Milgrim, supra note 4, at 163. When combining copyright protection and trade
secret protection, "[tihe copyright marking is meant to provide protection only in the
event ... [keeping the program secret] fails." Bender, supra note 2, at 436.
184. Milgrim, supra note 4, at 163. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-06 (1982).
185. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
186. Id. § 501(a).
187. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.01. See also Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v.
Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977); Sid. & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
188. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982). See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp.,
558 F.2d 1090, 1092 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1977).
189. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1982).
See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.01[A].
190. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.01. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1983); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir.
1977); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
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many cases the defendants have admitted access;191 in others the
defendants have been licensees or users of the software. 192 If the
programs are heavily marketed, 9 3 the court may presume access
from marketing of the plaintiff's copyrighted work. 94 Showing
"substantial similarity" can prove considerably more difficult.
1. Substantial Similarity and Masking
"Substantial similarity" is not easily defined. As Judge
Learned Hand observed, the line establishing substantial simi-
larity is "of necessity vague"'9 5 and "wherever it is drawn will
seem arbitrary."196 The commonly accepted test of substantial
similarity is the "ordinary observer" test, under which infringe-
ment occurs when "an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work."'1 7 The problem with applying this test to computer pro-
grams is that the ordinary person does not have the technical
knowledge to be an informed factfinder. "It is difficult, if not
impossible, to apply these standard copyright principles to a
computer case, primarily because the ordinary lay observer often
is incapable of comparing line by line two sets of computer
source or object code."' 98 To overcome this problem, some pro-
grammers are including unique or identifying language in source
code. The appearance of an original program's unique and
meaningless words in an allegedly infringing work constitutes a
191. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607
(7th Cir. 1982); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1985); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
192. In GCA Corp., 1982 Copyright L. Dec. at 17,763, the court found access because
the defendants were former employees of the plaintiff. See also Q-Co Indus., Inc. v.
Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
193. See, e.g., Apple v. Franklin, supra notes 104-31 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. American-Bandai, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 146
(D.N.J. 1982).
195. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
196. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
197. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966). See also
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982);
Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981).
198. Conley & Bryan, supra note 168, at 582. For an explanation of "source code"
and "object code," see supra note 86.
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strong indicium of copying."9 In Apple Computer v. Franklin,
for example, the name of the Apple programmer was found em-
bedded in the Franklin product.
200
Even without the use of identifying language, the ordinary
lay person will be able to recognize infringement if the infringer
makes a verbatim copy. Unfortunately, pirates can employ some
simple techniques to mask their infringement. "Procedure and
data names may be changed and whole sections of code may be
rearranged with just a few keystrokes in a terminal. '2 0' 1 It is
easy, therefore, for a proficient pirate to "render a program vir-
tually unrecognizable in just a few minutes.
2 02
Because of the ease of masking programs, industry experts
have undertaken to determine what makes a particular program
unique.203 These inquiries have focused on the output,204 the
program's logic, and the structure of data.20 5 In infringement
cases the output of the alleged infringing program will usually be
similar to the original program's output. Embodied in output is
the program's unique logic. To determine the logical similarity
of two programs, experts generally examine three aspects of the
programs: the input, the output, and the processes used to trans-
form the input into the properly formatted output. They may
also compare the formatting of the output and input in the two
programs.206
2. Substantial Similarity of Programs in Different
Languages
It is particularly difficult to prove similarity of two pro-
199. See, e.g., Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1245; SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at
824.
200. 714 F.2d at 1245.
201. Dakin & Higgins, Fingerprinting a Program, DATAMATION, April 1982, at 133,
134.
202. Id. See, e.g., SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 823.
203. Dakin & Higgins, supra note 201, at 134.
204. "Output" is the tangible hardcopy form of information produced from a com-
puter. See D. BENDER, supra note 94, § 202.
205. The principles involved are based on the work of Jean-Dominique Warnier and
Kenneth T. Orr, who developed the Warnier-Orr Data Structural System Design
(DSSD), a technique that allows the building of new software systems. Dakin & Higgins,
supra note 201, at 134.
206. Id. at 138.
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grams that perform the same functions, but are written in differ-
ent languages. An infringement claim will lie, however, even
though the source code or object code of a copyrighted program
has been translated into another programming language.0 7 A pi-
rating translator faced with to an infringement claim could re-
spond with two arguments.
First, the defendant could argue that since none of the orig-
inal code was used, the "expression" was not appropriated, and,
therefore, no infringement occurred.20 This argument, however,
is easily rebutted. Apple v. Franklin made it clear that "a com-
puter program, whether in object code or source code, is a 'liter-
ary work' and is protected from unauthorized copying, whether
from its object or source code version.
'20 9
Second, the translator could argue that the allegedly in-
fringing program itself deserves copyright protection. The pirate
could further argue that his program, as "the fruit of intellectual
labor, ' 210 is a work of authorship and that, because it is re-
corded, it is "expressed in a tangible medium. ' 211 This argu-
ment, however, will also fail. The holder of a copyright has the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works.212 Section 101 of the
1976 Act defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one
or more pre-existing works. 11 3 A translation of a literary work,
such as a computer program, would be a derivative work since it
is based on the preexisting work. Further, the legislative history
to section 103 of the Act explicitly states that "an unauthorized
translation of a novel would not be copyrighted at all. .. ,214
Similarly, an unauthorized translation of copyrighted software is
not entitled to copyright protection, but is merely an infringing
derivative work.
Three recent court decisions have considered the issue of
translation piracy and reached similar conclusions. In Whelan
207. See supra note 86.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
209. 714 F.2d at 1249.
210. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
211. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
212. Id. § 106.
213. Id. § 101.
214. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CoDr CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5671.
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Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,215 a Pennsylvania
federal district court concluded that a program written in BA-
SIC language infringed a copyrighted program that was written
in Event Driven Language (EDL).2 18 According to the court,
"The expression of the idea embodied in a computer program is
protected by the copyright laws even though it must be altered
and refined to be made adaptable to different types of com-
puters that have different methods of responding to command
controls and therefore require different source codes. ' 21  The
court found that the defendant had access to the original pro-
gram's source code and that the similarity between the two pro-
grams was extensive. 1 s In addition to accepting expert testi-
mony to evaluate the degree of similarity between the two
programs, the court considered the "almost identical" visual
screens that were displayed by the programs and accepted testi-
mony that prospective users and buyers could not find substan-
tial differences between the two programs. 1 9
In SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc.,
220
a Vanderbilt University professor required the use of SAS, the
plaintiff's sophisticated statistical computing program. A prob-
lem arose, however, because Vanderbilt had a DEC VAX com-
puter system and SAS was available only for IBM and IBM
compatible computers. To solve the problem, the professor,
some of his collegues, and S & H formed a limited partnership
to develop an SAS program that would operate on a DEC VAX
system. 221 Toward this end, the defendant became a licensee of
the SAS program and obtained the SAS source code.222 SAS In-
stitute alleged that S & H, in the process of preparing its prod-
uct, made unauthorized copies of the SAS source code and that
the S & H product was either a copy or a derivative work of
215. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
216. EDL is a recognized computer language. Id. at 1310. See supra note 86.
217. Id. at 1320 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1321. In finding similarity, it appears that the court relied heavily on
expert testimony and was inclined to rule in plaintiff's favor because the defendant's
expert was not well informed about the programs at issue. See id. at 1321-22.
219. Id. at 1322.
220. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). For a discussion of the case by one of the
attorneys involved, see Conley & Bryan, supra note 168, at 582 & n. 158.
221. 605 F. Supp. at 819.
222. Id. at 821.
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SAS. 2 3
The court found for the plaintiff on both claims. Consider-
ing the second infringement claim, the court stated that the de-
fendant had duplicated the plaintiff's expression, not just its
ideas, and that a substantial similarity existed between the or-
ganization and structure of the defendant's and the plaintiff's
programs.224 The court also found that because S & H targeted
SAS for duplication, the S & H program was an unauthorized
derivative work within the statutory definition.225
Unlike the defendants in Whelan and SAS Institute, the
defendant in E. F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America226
did not have access to the source code. E. F. Johnson (EFJ) de-
veloped a technologically advanced mobile radio and repeater
system and a compatible mobile radio.221 7 In an effort to develop
a competitive mobile radio that was compatible with the EFJ
radio and repeater system, Uniden accessed the EFJ program
and created its own software. Uniden admitted that engineers
removed the EFJ microchip, which stored the object code of the
program, and converted the object code into a programming lan-
guage from which Uniden flowcharted the EFJ program. 228 Be-
cause of the similarities in the EFJ and Uniden programs, EFJ
claimed copyright infringement and moved for a preliminary
injunction.
The court considered the plaintiff's likelihood of success on
the merits and found prima facie evidence of a valid copy-
right.229 The court also found that Uniden had access to the pro-
gram and that substantial similarity existed between the two
programs. The court cited similarity in two programs' logic as
evidence of substantial similarity and noted that the Uniden
223. Id. at 828.
224. Id. at 830. The trial court found at least forty-four specific examples of copy-
ing. Id.
225. Id. at 831.
226. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
227. Id. at 1487. When EFJ first conceived the idea for its trunk radio system, there
were no trunk radio systems on the market. Id. at 1488. According to the court,
"'[T]runking' of frequency channels permits the system to afford all system users auto-
matic access to all channels for maximum efficiency." Id. at 1489.
228. Id. at 1490.
229. The court concluded that the copyright registration was prima facie evidence of
the copyright. Id. at 1492 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v.
Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1091 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1977)).
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program did not employ the most efficient steps to perform cer-
tain functions. 230 In addition, the Uniden program contained un-
necessary instructions that had been included by mistake in the
EFJ program,23' and the court concluded "that Uniden unwit-
tingly copied the unnecessary instructions when translating the
EFJ code virtually verbatim.
'232
Although the programs did not match up line for line when
converted to the same programming language, the court followed
Whelan and found that a "line-by-line comparison becomes
meaningless" when examining a converted program.233 The court
granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and
held that the defendant could develop software to compete with
the plaintiff's, but not "by copying the exact number and se-
quence of bytes or items by which Plaintiff's program causes the
machine to operate.
'23 4
C. Defenses
1. Reverse Engineering
Regardless of the uniqueness of a computer program, the
copyright protection extends only to the expression and not to
the underlying idea.235 The use of ideas is unrestricted. Thus,
the door is always open for a programmer to learn the logic of a
program and then rewrite it in a noninfringing manner. Unfortu-
nately, "No principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' ,,236
The CONTU report considered the process of reverse engineer-
ing237 and found that "[wihen other language is available, pro-
grammers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the
230. 623 F. Supp. at 1494-95.
231. Id. at 1495-96.
232. Id. at 1496.
233. Id. at 1497.
234. Id. at 1504.
235. 17 U.S.C. 102(b) (1982).
236. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
237. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Supreme Court
defined reverse engineering as: "starting with the known product and working backward
to devine the process which aided in its development or manufacture." Id. at 476 (foot-
note omitted).
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ideas embodied in them in preparing their own works. '23 8 The
report also noted that "one is always free to make the machine
do the same thing as it would if it had the copyright work placed
in it, but by one's own creative effort rather than by piracy.
' '23 9
The second work, as the "fruit of intellectual labor, ' 240 would
also be eligible for copyright protection.
On the other hand, reverse engineering may thwart the pol-
icy underlying copyright protection. One of the purposes of
copyright is to "persuade authors to make their ideas freely ac-
cessible to the public so that they may be used for the intellec-
tual advancement of mankind. '241 If imitation is permitted,
software developers will resort increasingly to trade secret pro-
* 242 thtection, and the free access to ideas will be stifled. The pro-
ducer of software is understandably fearful of marketing its
software only to watch a competitor market a similar version a
few months later, either by piracy or by "legitimate" reverse
engineering.
When a party asserts the defense of "reverse engineering,"
the court must analyze the similarities between the two pro-
grams very carefully. Since it was the idea that the second pro-
gram borrowed from the original, the logical similarity between
the two will necessarily be "very close. 2 43 In addition, the se-
quence of events in a reengineered program will probably also be
similar to the original. Computer programs produced through re-
verse engineering do not necessarily infringe, but if the reen-
gineered program follows the original too closely, an infringe-
ment may occur. The burden rests upon the reengineering party
to prove reverse engineering, and that burden should be a diffi-
cult one. Otherwise common piracy could be erroneously classi-
fied as reverse engineering. When a defendant claims reverse en-
gineering, a court should analyze the similarities of the programs
even more than in other alleged infringement cases.
238. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 20 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 21.
240. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
241. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[A] (citing Eichel v. Martin, 241 F. 404,
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
242. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
243. Dakins & Higgins, supra note 201, at 140.
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2. Fair Use
"Fair use," a common defense to infringement claims, is
rarely raised in software cases. The fair use doctrine, derived
from section 107 of the Act and considered "an equitable rule of
reason," defies attempts at specific definition: "each case . . .
must be decided on its own facts. '244 Nevertheless, the statute
delineates the following four factors that should be considered
when determining whether a specific use of a work is a fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.245
Although both user and competitor pirates could assert a fair
use defense, the results in the two cases would differ considera-
bly because of the different degree of commercial use.
a. User Piracy
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,246 the Su-
preme Court considered whether copying television programs for
later viewing was a legitimate fair use and decided that it was.
The Court's application of the four statutory fair use factors,
however, suggests some differences between "timeshifting" and
user reproduction of software.
The Court adopted the lower court's conclusion regarding
the first factor and found that "time-shifting for private home
use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activ-
ity. ' 247 Similarly, the purpose and character of a user pirate's
copying of a work could be classified as noncommercial, non-
profit activity since the user pirate normally copies a program
stored on a disk for his own convenience rather than for later
244. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5679.
245. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
246. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
247. Id. at 449.
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sale.
Discussing the second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted
work," the Sony court concluded that "time shifting merely en-
ables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to
witness in its entirety free of charge."24 In contrast, the pro-
grams copied by most user pirates are not offered free of charge;
the user must purchase them. In addition, the software producer
intends to sell additional copies of the program as demand rises.
Thus, when a user buys one copy and reproduces it as the need
increases, the copying conflicts with the purpose or nature of the
producer's work. A user could argue, however, that since section
107 provides an exception for certain types of copying, copying
is not completely contrary to the nature of the work. Thus, non-
profit reproduction, at least for in-house use, should not be
prohibited.
A court basing its fairness assessment heavily on the third
statutory factor, the amount of the program copied, would prob-
ably find that copying by a noncommercial consumer is not a
fair use. A user would almost always copy the entire program
since a single portion would be useless. The Sony Court, how-
ever, did not rely on this factor in its analysis. In fact, the Court
explicitly stated that "the fact that the entire work is repro-
duced. . . does not have its ordinary effect of militating against
a finding of fair use.' '249 If courts adopt a similar attitude toward
user piracy, placing less emphasis on the portion copied, this
factor should not prove fatal to a defense of fair use.
The decisive factor for the Sony Court appears to have been
the fourth one, the effect of the use on the market. 250 According
to the Court, "A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copy-
righted work requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would ad-
versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." '251
Although unauthorized copying of software could reach signifi-
cant proportions and hurt the profits from software sales, it is
uncertain whether the original software producer's market would
be drastically reduced by customers copying software instead of
248. Id.
249. Id. at 449.50 (citation omitted).
250. Id. at 450-51.
251. Id. at 451.
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buying additional packages. The misuse would have to be so
rampant that it noticeably affected a company's profits.
Thus, a user pirate facing a claim of copyright infringement
would be well advised to raise the defense of fair use. The argu-
ment might fail because of the potential harm to the original
software producer's market; on the other hand, the uncertainty
of the harm might induce a court to accept the defense.
b. Competitor Piracy
The competitor pirate would have great difficulty in sup-
porting a defense of fair use. When the use has a commercial or
profit-making purpose, a presumption of unfair use arises. 25 2 In
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,253 the Su-
preme Court identified the crucial issue as "whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price. "254 A competitor of an orig-
inal software producer who pirates the original producer's
software obviously stands to profit from the copying; the pirate
can avoid a substantial investment in development and then
pass the savings on to the customer.
Application of the second and third statutory factors to a
competitor pirate case would yield the same result as in a user
piracy case. The fourth factor, however, would probably be fatal
to the competitor pirate's defense. The dramatic distinction be-
tween user and competitor pirates lies in the effect each pro-
duces on the software market. When the copying is for commer-
cial gain, as in the case of competitor piracy, a showing of actual
present harm is not needed, and the likelihood of future harm
may be presumed.255 Thus, the competitor pirate would have a
heavy burden to overcome in proving fair use.
VI. EXTRAJUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO PIRACY
Perhaps the most encouraging recent development for the
software industry is the realization by computer manufacturers
252. Id. at 449.
253. 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
254. 105 S. Ct. at 2231-32 (citations omitted).
255. 464 U.S. at 451.
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that cooperation with each other can reduce the likelihood of
some piracy. IBM, for example, recently announced a plan to
join forces with Microsoft Corporation, a software supplier, to
develop operating systems programs2 56 for personal computers.
Under their agreement, Microsoft will have the right to market
the systems programs to other computer manufacturers.
Software producers have expressed relief that IBM is not plan-
ning to exclude the rest of the industry from producing software
to run on future IBM computers.5 If such access had been
available to Franklin Computer, infringement might still have
occurred, but would have made Franklin's defense of alleged
good faith efforts to produce Apple compatible software untena-
ble.2 58 If the SAS system in SAS Institute had been available for
the DEC VAX Vanderbilt system, the professor could have
gained the benefits legitimately, without infringing.2 59 The IBM-
Microsoft agreement should promote compatibility and en-
courage competition. With greater compatibility, computer own-
ers will be able to choose from a wider range of software produc-
ers and will not be obliged to purchase products only from the
hardware manufacturer.
Promotion of hardware compatibility was the motivation
behind formation of the Corporation for Open Systems, an in-
dustry association that is attempting to develop standards for
enabling computers manufactured by different companies to
communicate with each other.260 Despite this and similar efforts,
however, infringement will undoubtedly continue at least until
all hardware and software products are interchangeable, and
probably even beyond. The stringent law being developed .in the
courts will help protect the original producer's exclusive rights.
256. For an explanation of "operating systems programs," see supra note 105.
257. Microsoft and I.B.M. Join Forces, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at D1, col. 6.
258. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
260. Computer Makers Seeking Standards, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1986, at D4, col. 3.
The companies participating in the organization include the Burroughs Corp., Digital
Equip. Corp., AT&T, Control Data, Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell, NCR, Sperry, Telex,
Wang Laboratories, and Xerox. IBM is noticeably absent from the list of current mem-
bers, but may join later. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Software producers have genuine fears about their ability to
market a unique product that will not be pirated by competitors
or users. Statutory provisions and case law indicate that applica-
tion and systems programs, whether of object code or source
code, are copyrightable. Recent decisions, however, may have
gone too far in holding that all systems programs are protectible.
To show infringement of a copyrighted program, a plaintiff
must demonstrate access to the copyrighted work as well as sub-
stantial similarity. In software cases courts should be especially
careful to analyze the programs for substantial similarities de-
spite the difficulties in comparing source codes.
Two affirmative defenses are available for software pirates.
Reverse engineering should protect competitor copiers in a
proper case. The "fair use" defense, on the other hand, is more
likely to aid user pirates than competitor pirates.
Finally, society may look to the industry to circumvent the
need to copy by cooperating to make software and hardware uni-
versally compatible. These efforts should be welcome news both
for computer purchasers and for the courts. Consumers will have
more, and cheaper, options when shopping for hardware and
software. The courts, on the other hand, will see fewer infringe-
ment cases, and in those that do arise, the parties' arguments
should be easier to evaluate.
Sylvia Ann Matthews
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